

Message Text

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SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S COMMONWEALTH CLUB SPEECH

REF: (A) STATE 181885, (B) SEOUL 5568

1. HEREWITH FINAL TEXT REQUESTED PARA 2 REFTEL.

2. TODAY AS WE PONDER THE CRITICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE WORLD WE CAN BE CERTAIN THAT THERE IS ONE OF SUCH OVERWHELMING IMPORTANCE FOR BOTH THE SHORT AND THE LONG TERM AS TO REQUIRE OUR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION. I REFER TO THE ENORMOUS GAP BETWEEN THE LESS-DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF OUR GLOBE.

3. THIS DISPARITY HAS ALREADY CAUSED SERIOUS STRAINS IN THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIALIZED--OR INDUSTRIALIZING--NATIONS AND THE LESS-DEVELOPED WORLD. THE GAP IS SO WIDE, AND GROWING IN SOME CASES, THAT IT RAISES SERIOUS QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER THE LESS-DEVELOPED CAN MAKE THE GRADE.

4. I THINK THAT FOR MANY OF THE ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTION, WE MUST LOOK TO NORTHEAST ASIA. OUTSIDE THE WEST, THE ONLY REGION AS A WHOLE WHICH HAS MEANINGFULLY ENTERED THE INDUSTRIAL AGE IS NORTHEAST ASIA.

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5. IT IS ONLY THE NATIONS OF NORTHEAST ASIA--JAPAN,

THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA--WHICH HAVE TAKEN THAT GIGANTIC STEP FORWARD WHICH REMOVES THEM FROM THE ROSTER OF LESSER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND PLACES THEM ON THE LIST OF NATIONS WHICH HAVE EITHER REACHED THE STAGE OF SELF-SUSTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH OR SOMETHING VERY CLOSE TO IT.

6. BEFORE THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BROUGHT IT INTO THE INDUSTRIAL AGE AND PROPELLED IT TO THE STAGE OF SELF-SUSTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH, KOREA WAS A COUNTRY RULED BY A RURAL, LANDED ELITE WITH A FUNDAMENTALLY CONFUCIAN MIND-SET AND A RIGIDLY HIERARCHICAL SOCIETAL STRUCTURE. TODAY IT IS A FULL-FLEDGED MEMBER OF THE MODERN WORLD, GOVERNED BY A NEW ELITE OF LARGEY WESTERN-TRAINED, PRAGMATIC MEN AND WOMEN WHO HAVE FULLY ACCEPTED WESTERN MANAGEMENT METHODS AND TECHNOLOGY IN ADDITION TO MODERN PLANNING TECHNIQUES. IT IS DYNAMIC AND OUTWARD-LOOKING, AN ECONOMIC POWER IN ITS OWN RIGHT, SECOND ONLY TO JAPAN IN NON- COMMUNIST ASIA.

7. THIS TRANSFORMATION IN SOUTH KOREA HAS BEEN RAPID--WE CAN PROBABLY DATE ITS MAJOR THRUST FROM 1965. BUT BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN RAPID, AND BECAUSE THE DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS HAS CONFRONTED AND CONFLICTS WITH MANY SOCIAL AND CULTURAL VALUES WHICH WER DEEPLY IMBEDDED IN ANCIENT KOREAN TRADITION, IT HAS BROUGHT WITH IT TRAUMA--IN SOME CASES SEVERE.

8. AS MODERN AND POWERFUL AS KOREA HAS BECOME, ITS PEOPLE ARE STILL STRUGGLING TOWARD A NEW CULTURAL IDENTITY WHICH WILL PRESERVE THE COMFORTING TRADITIONS OF CONFUCIANISM AND STILL PERMIT THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION TO CONTINUE. THE HIERARCHICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIETY HAS BEEN ALTERED BUT WILL PROBABLY PERSIST BECAUSE, AGAIN, IT PROVIDES SATISFACTION FOR THE PEOPLE. THE VILLAGE STRUCTURE IS CHANGING, NEW LEADERSHIP AND GRASS ROOTS PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT IS EMERGING. WESTERN LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC VALUES ARE FAR FROM ALIEN TO KOREA, BUT THEY ARE NOT YET FULLY LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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ACCEPTED BY ALL KOREANS, OR DEEPLY IMPLANTED. I PERSONALLY LOOK FOR A SYNTHESIS--ONE WHICH WILL PRESERVE INCREASING PARTICIPATION BY THE PEOPLE IN THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT.

9. THERE IS ONE KEY POINT TO REMEMBER, HOWEVER, AND THAT IS THAT THE KOREAN PEOPLE HAVE SHARED RELATIVELY EQUITABLY IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS. ITS BENEFITS

HAVE NOT BEEN LIMITED TO THE FEW.

10. IN 1953 AT THE END OF THE KOREAN WAR, PER CAPITA GNP WAS \$67. BY 1965 IT WAS \$106. LAST YEAR IT WAS \$531 AND I FULLY EXPECT KOREAN PLANNERS TO REACH THEIR GOAL OF \$1,284 IN 1981. LAST YEAR FOR THE FIRST TIME, FAMILY INCOME IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR SURPASSED FAMILY INCOME IN THE CITIES--REVERSING THE CLASSIC PATTERN. THESE FIGURES ARE STILL LOW, BUT COMPARED TO WHERE KOREA WAS AND MOST OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD STILL IS, THEY ARE REMARKABLE.

11. WHILE THE TRANSFORMATION OF KOREAN RURAL LIFE IS ALMOST REVOLUTIONARY, OVERALL STATISTICS ON THE ECONOMY ARE EQUAL AS IMPRESSIVE. SINCE THE EARLY 1960'S THE KOREAN ECONOMY HAS EXCEEDED EVEN THE MOST OPTIMISTIC EXPECTATIONS AS AVERAGE ANNUAL REAL GROWTH OF GNP HAS SURPASSED 9PERCENT. IN THE LAST THREE YEARS ITS DOMESTIC SAVINGS HAVE GROWN TO AVERAGE 20PERCENT OF GNP WHICH, WITH ITS TRULY IMPRESSIVE RECORD IN REDUCING THE POPULATION GROWTH RATE AND ITS LOW CAPITAL-OUTPUT RATIO, HAVE PLACED IT AMONG THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE ACHIEVED SELF-SUSTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH.. 0-458:7)-46 IMPRESSIVE WAS KOREA'S RECORD OF ALMOST 8PERCENT GROWTH DURING THE DIFFICULT YEARS OF THE OIL CRISIS AND WORLDWIDE RECESSION, 1974 AND 1975.

12. CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT AT THIS PACE WILL BRING MANY CHANGES. FOR ONE, WE WILL SEE A CONTINUATION OF THE ALREADY WELL-ESTABLISHED TREND AWAY FROM CREDIT AT CONCESSIONAL TERMS TO CREDIT AT COMMERCIAL RATES. THIS HAS ALREADY TAKEN PLACE. THE UNITED STATES SUPPLIES NO MORE GRANT ECONOMIC AID TO KOREA. ITS CREDIT NOW LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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COMES LARGELY FROM INTERNATIONAL LENDING AGENCIES AND COMMERCIAL SOURCES.

13. SECONDLY, THE RAPID PACE OF DEVELOPMENT WILL MEAN A FAR MORE SELF-RELIANT DEFENSE POSTURE. AS IN THE CASE OF ECONOMIC AID, WE ARE SUPPLYING NO MORE GRANT MILITARY AID TO KOREA. THEY ARE FUNDING THEIR MILITARY PURCHASES THROUGH FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS AND BY USE OF THEIR OWN FOREIGN EXCHANGE. IN FISCAL 1975 KOREANS COMMITTED ONLY 59 MILLION DOLLARS TO COVER FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CREDITS PURCHASES WHILE U.S. GRANT AID WAS 82.6 MILLION DOLLARS. BY FY-1977 THE PROPORTION WILL SHIFT DRAMATICALLY WITH COMMITMENT OF SOME 275 MILLION DOLLARS FOR CREDIT SALES AND ONLY 8.3 MILLION IN RESIDUAL GRANT SUPPLY OPERATIONS. NO

GRANT MATERIAL AID IS PLANNED FOR FY-77 AND BEYOND.
INDEED, THE KOREANS ARE FORMALLY COMMITTED TO MILITARY
SELF-RELIANCE IN THEIR RECENTLY-ANNOUNCED DEFENSE FORCE
IMPROVEMENT PLAN.

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14. THIRD, THE HIGH KOREAN RATES OF GROWTH WILL ENHANCE
THE ALREADY WELL-ESTABLISHED TREND TOWARD OUTWARD-LOOK-
ING DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY. THIS WILL, IN TURN, RESULT
IN A FURTHER DIVERSIFICATION OF ITS MARKETS, AND A
FURTHER REDUCTION OF ITS RELIANCE ON A FEW ESTABLISHED
SOURCES OF SUPPLY FOR RAW MATERIALS. AND IT WILL ALSO
MEAN INCREASING OPPORTUNITIES FOR AMERICAN SALES AND
INVESTMENTS.

15. JUST BEFORE I LEFT KOREA, I SAW THE FIRST
OUTLINES OF THE FOURTH FIVE YEAR PLAN. I WAS STRUCK
BY THE CONCENTRATION ON SOCIAL WELFARE AND INFRASTRUCTURE
IN THIS PLAN. THE KOREANS QUITE CLEARLY DO NOT INTEND
TO PROCEED WITH DEVELOPMENT AT HIGHT RATES ONLY TO END
UP A QUARTER OF A CENTURY LATER WITH PROBLEMS OF POLLU-
TION, UNREALIZED CITY-PLANNING, LACK OF WELFARE AND
HEALTH SERVICES AND THE LIKE. THEY ARE MOVING TO SOLVE
THESE PROBLEMS TODAY--WHILE THEY CAN STILL BE SOLVED.

16. GIVEN THIS TYPE OF INTELLIGENT, FORWARD-LOOKING
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, WE SHOULD IN ASSURPRISINGLY SHORT
TIME SEE AN ECONOMICALLY INDEPENDENT AND MILITARYILY
STRONG KOREA--GOALS WE HAVE BEEN STRIVING FOR SINCE THE
END OF THE KOREAN WAR.

17. THERE IS ANOTHER POINT TO BE MADE ABOUT KOREAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY. UNLIKE NORTH KOREA, THE SOUTH AS GIVEN CLEAR PRIORITY IN THE ALLOCATION OF ITS RESOURCES TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT RATHER THAN TO MILITARY

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OR SECURITY EXPENDITURE. THIS HAS PROVED TO BE A VERY WISE DECISION INDEED, FOR IT HAS ESTABLISHED A BASIC ECONOMIC FOUNDATION FOR SOUTH KOREA'S SURVIVAL.

18. ALL THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN A HOSTILE ATMOSPHERE.

19. TO THE NORTH, SOUTH KOREA FACES AN ADVERSARY WHICH HAS NEVER DISAVOWED THE USE OF FORCE AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING ITS DOMINATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA. IT IS IN THE GRIP OF PERHAPS THE MOST RIGID COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE WORLD WHOSE PREDOMINANT FEATURE IS THE CULT OF PERSONALITY SURROUNDING ITS LEADER, KIM IL-SUNG. IT HAS ACTED IN THE PAST, UNPREDICTABLY. IT IS A REGIME WHICH HAS REBUFFED ALL ATTEMPTS BY THE SOUTH TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE TO LESSEN TENSIONS. INDEED IT APPEARS TO BE SERIOUS OF SEEING TENSION REMAIN HIGH, AND AS ONE EVIDENCE I WOULD CITE THE NORTH KOREAN CONSTRUCTION OF TWO TUNNELS UNDER THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE WHICH SEPARATES THE TWO COUNTRIES.

20. GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE SOUTH'S ADVERSARY, I CAN ONLY DESCRIBE THE SITUATION ON THE PENINSULA AS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS, REQUIRING A HIGH DEGREE OF READINESS ALONG THE BORDER, THE OPPOSING MILITARY FORCES, NORTH AND SOUTH, ARE ROUGHLY IN BALANCE WITH NO IMMEDIATE LIKELIHOOD OF MAJOR NORTH KOREAN MILITARY INITIATIVES. THE NORTH KOREANS HAVE CONSTANTLY STRENGTHENED THEIR FORCES ALONG AND BEHIND THE DMZ BUT THE BALANCE HAS BEEN MAINTAINED BY THE PRESENCE OF 42,000 AMERICAN TROOPS IN KOREA. THESE TROOPS CONSIST CHIEFLY OF GROUND AND AIR ELEMENTS.

21. WHY SHOULD WE STILL BE IN KOREA?

22. WE ARE IN KOREA PRIMARILY BECAUSE IT IS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST TO BE THERE.

23. WE HAVE, OF COURSE, A COMMITMENT TO KOREA. THIS COMMITMENT IS IMBEDDED IN THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY OF 1954 AND BINDS US TO COME TO THE ASSISTANCE OF

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KOREA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES, SHOULD KOREA COME UNDER ATTACK AGAIN. BUT WHAT INTERESTS LAY BEHIND THAT COMMITMENT? ARE THEY STILL VALID TODAY, 22 YEARS LATER?

24. WE ARE IN KOREA FOR VERY IMPORTANT STRATEGIC REASONS. GEOPOLITICALLY, THIS SMALL COUNTRY--ABOUT A QUARTER OF THE SIZE OF CALIFORNIA--LIES AT THE VERY NEXUS OF THE INTERESTS OF FOUR MAJOR POWERS, JAPAN, THE SOVIET UNION, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AND THE UNITED STATES. PEACE AND STABILITY ON THE PENINSULA ARE THUS VITAL TO PEACE IN NORTHEAST ASIA AND THE SECURITY OF KOREA IS DIRECTLY LINKED TO THE SECURITY OF JAPAN. IT WOULD ALSO BE OF INTENSE INTEREST TO BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA WHICH SUPPORTED THE NORTH KOREANS MATERIALLY AND POLITICALLY IN THE KOREAN WAR. RENEWED HOSTILITIES WOULD IMMEDIATELY RAISE THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF WHETHER THE CONFLICT COULD BE CONTAINED WITHIN THE PENINSULA. THE RISK OF A WIDER CONFLICT DEVELOPING IS SELF-EVIDENT.

25. THUS, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT REASON FOR OUR PRESENCE IN KOREA IS TO DETER--AND TO PREVENT--RENEWED HOSTILITIES, ANOTHER ATTACK BY THE NORTH UPON THE SOUTH. OUR PRESENCE THERE IS AN INSURANCE POLICY AND IT HAS WORKED. DETERRING--AND PREVENTING--RENEWED HOSTILITY IN KOREA IS CLEARLY THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES PRESENCE THERE. BUT SO, AGAIN, IS IT A MAJOR CONSIDERATION FOR JAPAN. WE ALSO BELIEVE IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE PRC AND THE SOVIET UNION NOT TO DISTURB THE BALANCE ON THE PENINSULA.

26. IN RECENT YEARS, AMERICAN INTERESTS HAVE BEGUN TO BROADEN, TO GROW BEYOND THE ESSENTIAL SECURITY AND STRATEGIC CONCERN WHICH ARISE FROM KOREA'S PIVOTAL GEOGRAPHIC POSITION BETWEEN THE THREE GREAT AND PRINCIPAL ASIAN POWERS.

27. WE ALREADY HAVE AN IMPORTANT ECONOMIC STAKE IN SOUTH KOREA AND IT WILL GROW. OUR TRADE WITH KOREA IS SIGNIFICANT AND GROWING. LAST YEAR, KOREAN IMPORTS FROM

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THE UNITED STATES TOTLED \$1.8 BILLION, AND COULD DOUBLE BY THE 1980'S. THIS IS ALMOST 26 PERCENT OF KOREA'S TOTAL IMPORTS. TOGETHER WITH JAPAN, THE UNITED STATES HOLDS 60 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL KOREAN IMPORT MARKET. THE UNITED

STATES IS THE LARGEST MARKET FOR KOREAN EXPORTS--\$1.2 BILLION IN THE FIRST HALF OF THIS YEAR. AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN KOREA IS ALSO CONSIDERABLE AND ADDS ANOTHER DIMENSION TO THIS ECONOMIC INTEREST AS A CLEAR ADD-ON TO OUR SECURITY CONCERNS.

28. AND, FINALLY, AS KOREA BECOMES ONE OF THE FIRST INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS OF ASIA AND REACHES MIDDLE POWER STATUS, WITH THE LARGEST AND BEST-EQUIPPED MILITARY FORCE IN NON-COMMUNIST ASIA, OUR KOREAN INTERESTS WILL FURTHER EXPAND TO A NEW AND BROADER DIMENSION INVOLVING A CLEAR AND DEMONSTRABLE AMERICAN STAKE IN ASSURING CONTINUED COOPERATION AND FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIPS WITH KOREA AND AN ENDURING PEACE ON THE PENINSULA.

29. AND CERTAINLY KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY LEAVES LITTLE TO BE DESIRED IF ONE MEASURES IT AGAINST THE DEGREE TO WHICH IT MESHES WITH OUR OWN INTEREST IN ASIA.

30. LIKE ITS SECURITY AND ECONOMIC POLICIES, KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY IS, AS I SAID EARLIER, FUNDAMENTALLY GEARED TO SURVIVAL IN A HOSTILE ATMOSPHERE. SURVIVAL, HISTORICALLY AND TODAY AS WELL, IS THE NAME OF THE GAME FOR KOREA. SOUTH KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY CONTINUES TO FOCUS PRIMARILY ON MAINTAINING KOREA'S ALREADY WIDELY-RECOGNIZED LEGITIMACY AS THE SOVEREIGN POWER IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE PENINSULA. CONVERSELY, ONE MIGHT ADD, NORTH KOREAN POLICY IS DESIGNED TO THWART THIS AIM AND, AS NOTED, THE NORTH HAS NOT DISAVOWED THE USE OF MILITARY METHODS OR THE TECHNIQUES OF SUBVERSION TO CHALLENGE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE SOUTH.

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31. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THE SOUTH HAS CLEARLY RECOGNIZED THE DANGER OF OPEN-ENDED, UNRESOLVED, INDEFINITE TENSION ON THE PENINSULA, CAUSED BY THE COMPETITION BETWEEN THE TWO VASTLY DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT EXISTING THERE. AND IT HAS TAKEN SERIOUS STEPS TO REMOVE OR, AT LEAST, LESSEN THAT TENSION. SOUTH KOREA'S ATTEMPTS TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH THE NORTH, A DIALOGUE WHICH MIGHT CONCEIVABLY LEAD TO A SETTLEMENT OF DIFFERENCES AND EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION, HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY REBUFFED BY THE NORTH. SO HAVE ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE FOR MORE HUMANITARIAN ENDS SUCH AS VISITS BETWEEN FAMILIES DIVIDED BY A WAR WHICH WAS FOUGHT 26 YEARS AGO--TALKS WHICH WERE HELD UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE RED CROSS ORGANIZATIONS OF EACH SIDE. THESE, TOO HAVE SHOWN LITTLE PROGRESS BECAUSE OF NORTHERN INTRANSIGENCE.

32. AS A PART OF ITS OWN EFFORT TO LESSEN TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND THUS INSURE ITS OWN SURVIVAL, SOUTH KOREA HAS COOPERATED IN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS AT THE UN TO SEEK TO RE-ESTABLISH DIALOGUE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH AND TO REDUCE TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS EXPRESSED AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO A CONFERENCE OF THE POWERS DIRECTLY CONCERNED TO SEEK MORE LASTING ARRANGEMENTS TO MAINTAIN PEACE ON THE PENINSULA.

33. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES, HOWEVER, ARE NOT WITHOUT THEIR PROBLEMS.

34. FROM THE KOREAN STANDPOINT, I THINK THE PRIMARY
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PROBLEM IS ONE OF CONFIDENCE. KOREANS QUESTION THE AMERICAN WILL AND PURPOSE, THE DETERMINATION OF AMERICA TO EXERT ITS INFLUENCE IN KOREA AND ELSEWHERE AS A WORLD POWER AND TO ASSIST IN THE MAINTENANCE OF WORLD PEACE. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND KEY AND INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS HAVE BEEN AT PAINS TO REASSURE THE KOREANS OF THE VALIDITY OF OUR COMMITMENT TO THEM. BUT OUR DEPARTURE FROM VIETNAM CAME AS A GREAT SHOCK TO THE KOREANS.

35. FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE, THE GREATEST SINGLE ISSUE IS HUMAN RIGHTS.

36. AS SECRETARY KISSINGER SAID RECENTLY IN SEATTLE, "...WE WILL CONTINUE TO REMIND THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT THAT RESPONSIVENESS TO THE POPULAR WILL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE ARE ESSENTIAL IF SUBVERSION AND ETERNAL CHALLENGE ARE TO BE RESISTED. BUT WE SHALL NOT FORGET THAT OUR ALLIANCE WITH

SOUTH KOREA IS DESIGNED TO MEET AN EXTERNAL THREAT WHICH AFFECTS OUR OWN SECURITY, AND THAT OF JAPAN AS WELL."

37. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR--PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY--THAT, AS BOTH SECRETARY KISSINGER AND UNDER SECRETARY HABIB HAVE RECENTLY SAID, WE ARE NOT HAPPY WITH WHAT HAS HAPPENED RECENTLY IN SOUTH KOREA. BOTH IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATELY WE HAVE MADE OUR VIEWS KNOWN TO THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT-- STRONGLY AND WITHOUT EQUIVOCATION.

38. THE IMPACT OF THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES HAS LIKEWISE BEEN STRESSED.

39. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER--AND AGAIN I AM QUOTING SECRETARY KISSINGER, "...WE CANNOT LOSE SIGHT OF OUR BASIC CONCERNs OVER THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE AREA." WE CANNOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN THE MILITARY BALANCE IN KOREA TO INSURE THE SURVIVAL OF SOUTH KOREA. AND WE CANNOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE SUPPORT WHICH IT PROVIDES TO OUR SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN KOREA, JAPAN AND EAST ASIA GENERALLY.

40. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT OUR BASIC SECURITY RELATIONSHIP
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WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS NOT AN ISSUE BETWEEN THE PRESENT KOREAN GOVERNMENT AND THOSE WITHIN KOREA WHO ARE THE GOVERNMENT'S MOST OUTSPOKEN AND HARSHEST CRITICS.

41. THERE IS HOWEVER, A BROAD AWARENESS IN KOREA OF AMERICAN CONCERNs REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS. WHILE AMERICAN IDEALS OF HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN ARE SHARED, THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT OF TODAY SEES IT SITUATION IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE KOREAN VALUE SYSTEM AND THE THREAT TO ITS SECURITY.

42. TO SUM UP NOW----

43. WE SEE KOREA ONE OF THREE NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OF NORTHEAST ASIA WHICH HAS ENTERED THE INDUSTRIALIZED AGE, AND PROVIDES BY ITS EXAMPLE A SOURCE OF ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE LESS-DEVELOPED WORLD.

44. WE SEE A COUNTRY INCREASINGLY ABLE TO BEAR THE COSTS OF ITS OWN DEVELOPMENT AND DEFENSE WITHOUT OUR HELP.

45. WE SEE A COUNTRY UNDER THE CONSTANT THREAT OF ATTACK OR SUBVERSION FROM AN UNPREDICTABLE ADVERSARY WHICH COULD ENDANGER WORLD PEACE.

46. WE ALSO SEE A COUNTRY READY TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH ITS ADVERSARY TO LESSEN TENSIONS IN ONE OF THE MOST STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT AREAS OF THE GOBE. WE SEE A COUNTRY IN WHICH AMERICA HAS VITAL NATIONAL INTEREST.

47. WE SEE A COUNTRY WHOSE POLICIES IN MANY KEY RESPECTS MESH WELL WITH OUR OWN.

48. WE SEE A COUNTRY WITH WHICH, THROUGH TRADE AND INVESTMENT, WE WILL BE INCREASINGLY MORE CLOSELY LINKED.

49. AND WE SEE A COUNTRY STILL IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING ITS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS TO ATTUNE TO MODERN REALITIES.

50. WE MUST CONTINUE TO EVIDENCE OUR CONCERN FOR THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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MAINTENANCE OF BASIC HUMAN VALUES. BUT ABOVE ALL, WE MUST BENEFIT FROM THE LESSONS OUR PAST INVOLVEMENTS IN ASIA HAVE TAUGHT US: THAT CHANGE IS AS INEVITABLE IN ASIA AS IT IS HERE; THAT CHANGE WILL CAUSE TRAUMA AND SHOCK, BUT THAT CHANGE IS CAPABLE ALSO OF TRANSFORMING WHOLE SOCIETIES. WE MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT WHAT EMERGES WILL NOT BE A COMPLETE REJECTION OF PAST TRADITION AND VALUES. THAT HAS BEEN OUR EXPERIENCE, AND IS HAPPENING IN ASIA NOW. WE MUST FIND THE BREADTH OF VISION AND THE PROFUNDITY OF UNDERSTANDING TO COMPREHEND THE TRANSFORMATION NOW TAKING PLACE IN ASIA.

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